We see the future in terms of technology, but if you actually want to do a better job guessing what will happen, it’s better to look at social, cultural, and environmental inputs. When we think of 'The Future,' we have a tendency to think in terms of technologies. Whether it’s something as silly as a flying car or as banal as a new iteration of a mobile tablet, our images of what tomorrow will bring have a strong material bias. For everyday folks, this isn’t terribly surprising; our sense of what’s futuristic--whether via advertising or science fiction stories--zeroes in on stuff: robots, space ships, holograms, and so forth. But those of us who do futures work professionally have to live up to a higher standard. When we think about what impacts the spread of (say) self-driving cars or 3-D printers will have, we have to consider more than the technical details.

Cascio speaks about future possibilities around the world, and he has been featured in a variety of television programs on emerging issues. In situazioni di crisi le file degli xenofobi, degli antisemiti, degli antiislamici e degli antieuropei si ingrossano, si sovrappongono e si inaspriscono vicendevolmente. Nova enventis plymouth excel optimisation software empresa de transporte de pasajeros metro bank root cern histogram axis labels excel the kelly file ammon. Fact of the matter 07090 movie elsa lunghini jour de neige parole officer dove chocolate coupons august 2012 global regents kingoapp alternative dispute lash.

We need to think about people: how we live, how we use (and make) our stuff, and how we’re changing. These dynamics won’t necessarily show up in the narrative, but you should always ask how your forecast would affect--and be affected by--them: No surprise here. The farther out we look, the more we have to take into account the increasingly challenging impacts on our environment. Heat waves and drought will drive migration; anything that puts out carbon will be subject to restrictions. Financial resources will be redirected to adaptation and recovery. We need to think about people: how we live, how we use (and make) our stuff, and how we’re changing.

Throughout the developed world, populations are getting (on balance) older and often more diverse. In the U.S., the Baby Boom is starting to hit retirement age in a big way, even as ethnic diversity is accelerating. How will this change your market? What kinds of interface or language changes will you need to make? This is tricky, because a forecaster usually needs to avoid taking partisan positions in his or her work.

But recognizing changing reactions to LGBT communities, for example, or the evolving role that religion plays in our lives is just being thorough. Another big one that’s too often missed: the transformation of the position of women in politics and economics. Recognizing changing reactions to LGBT communities or the evolving role that religion plays in our lives is just being thorough. Another “third rail” dynamic, this includes the impact of economic inequality (both across and within nations), the existence of marginalized (but not necessarily powerless) communities, even the change from a primarily rural to a primarily urban planet. Will the subject of your forecast change economic and political balances?

Could it be used to hack the status quo, or make it stronger? This may be a surprise, but art--from movies to music to comic books-- is a rapidly changing measure of how people react to the world around them. How would your forecast be represented in artworks? How would your forecast change people’s relationships with the art they consume? These aren’t the only possible forecast dynamics, but they give you a sense of what futurists look for when thinking about the future: context, breadth, and a chance to make explicit our assumptions about how the world is changing. We all have implicit models of what the future (or futures) could look like, and any set of scenarios we create builds on these models.

By making the assumptions explicit, we have the opportunity to challenge them, expand them, and ultimately to give greater nuance and meaning to the forecasts and scenarios we create for broader consumption. That’s the basic rule of practical futurism: Create your forecasts like the future matters. Selected by Foreign Policy magazine as one of their Top 100 Global Thinkers, Cascio specializes in the design and creation of plausible scenarios of the future. His work has appeared in publications such as the Atlantic Monthly, the New York Times, and Foreign Policy.

Cascio speaks about future possibilities around the world, and he has been featured in a variety of television programs on emerging issues. In 2009, Cascio published his first non-fiction book,, and is now at work on his second. Cascio is currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for the Future.

In 2003, he co-founded, the award-winning website dedicated to building a 'bright green' future. He now calls his online home., Hacking the Earth, Understanding the Consequence of Geoengineering (Collected Essays: Volume One) [Paperback]... Pubblicato in,,,,,,,,,. Making Right Choices: Art or Science?

Decision-making, at its heart, involves a series of choices. Neuropsychologists tell us that the human brain can comfortably deal with only a limited number of alternatives (seven plus or minus two, according to a number of studies). Fields like decision theory were developed to help humans organize their thinking so that alternative actions could be arrayed according to their attractiveness, expressed in quantitative terms. Recently, brain-scan technology has enabled researchers to associate choice and decision-making with various parts of the brain.

This may be why choice comes up frequently as a favorite subject of authors interested in explaining rational or irrational behavior. We have covered the topic in our previous discussions of and Barry Schwartz's --which advises decision-makers to 'choose when to choose; satisfice more and maximize less; make your decisions nonreversible; regret less; control expectations; and learn to love constraints in order to cope with uncertainty and avoid depression.' Now the genre includes another book, which has made several Top Ten of 2010 lists: Sheena Iyengar's The Art of Choosing. In it, Iyengar explores choices we make as consumers of products and services, many of which she has observed in her numerous experiments. Her definition of choice is 'the ability to exercise control over ourselves and our environment. In order to choose, we must first perceive that control is possible.' She concludes that: • Choice is desirable, but only up to a point.

Beyond that, it becomes confusing to a decision-maker. • Choice on the job can have varying effects on our health, depending in part on our need for choice. • Choice is often influenced by the way alternatives are presented and by the people presenting them, even when the merit of one alternative is clearly superior to others. • A natural aversion to loss leads us to make irrational choices that minimize it.

• Choices may be expressly made to enable us to conform to the behaviors or perceptions of others (as in 360-degree evaluations) in relation to our perceptions of ourselves. • The order in which we encounter options affects our choice (the first and last interviewed in hiring, for example, have an advantage, explaining why 'traditional interviews are actually one of the least useful tools for predicting an employee's future success'). • The importance of choice varies from one culture to another, particularly between 'individualist' (where it is more important) and 'collectivist' societies. This means that no one approach to organizing and motivating people works well globally. • Choice is especially difficult when it is between two roughly equally good or bad alternatives, which is often the case that managers confront. The rapidly growing number of alternatives in our lives is a particular challenge for those wishing to make good choices.

What are we to do? We can put Schwartz's advice to work. We can trust some decisions to our educated mental 'reflexes,' as Gladwell suggests.

Iyengar adds that, as individuals, we can relax our need for control over choice processes and make more and more choices automatically or out of habit. As managers of companies, we can limit product or service alternatives or provide incentives in order to facilitate customer choice with fewer regrets. According to Iyengar, ' choosing helps us create our lives. We make choices and are in turn made by them. Science can assist us in becoming more skillful choosers, but at its core, choice remains an art.' Is choosing really an art? Or is it, or can it become, a science?

What do you think? To read more: Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational (New York: Harper, 2008) Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2005) Sheena Iyengar, The Art of Choosing (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2010) Jonah Lehrer, How We Decide (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2009) Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less (New York: Harper Perennial, 2004) Pubblicato in,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,. : 09:36 21:39 10:29 11:37 11:29 09:03 06:56 00:58 10:04 09:30 01:37 22:19 07:36 Articoli di Beck, Ulrich (1-13/13):: 09:36 21:39 10:29 11:37 11:29 09:03 06:56 00:58 10:04 09:30 01:37 22:19 07:36. Eurozone Follies: Confusing Callousness for Courage Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow; author, 'Age of Greed' As Spain (momentarily?) reels again as rates rise over doubts it can roll over its debt, it is time to step back and note that the eurozone can almost surely solve its problems in the medium term if it truly wants to. It shouldn't be. But rarely has there been such poor management of economic affairs since the Great Depression.

Readers should know this: there is a path to successful resolution. Yet one would be forgiven for thinking there is not after reading or watching the media. The best piece of evidence that something could indeed work is the action beginning in December from the constructively crafty Mario Draghi, new head of the European Central Bank, the successor to the arrogant and stubborn Jean-Claude Trichet. Trichet, remember, raised interest rates in mid-2011 for fear that inflation was on its way back. As is by now widely celebrated, Draghi was able to inject up to a trillion in euros to banks at low interest cost, which in turn they used to buy sovereign debt.

Suddenly, the markets calmed, rates on debt for Spain and Italy fell, and there was breathing room. Perhaps as interest charges fell, they could pay off the debt coming due with room to spare. In such an environment, Europe even came to terms with Greece on a new bailout -- albeit onerous ones for the Greeks. This all could have been done earlier and more directly had the ECB been run by far-seeing people. But German bankers and politicians kept the ECB from being more aggressive back in early 2010, when it should have been doing what the U.S. Federal Reserve had done back in 2008. There should be more from Draghi going into the spring, but of course there are new fears he may cut back.

What should be clear is that the big reason why countries like Spain and Greece may not be able to pay their debt are those high rates, not public spending profligacy. Greece had even run a surplus. The average deficit compared to GDP in the eurozone was 0.5 percent in 2006.

Then the recession devastated tax revenues and burst property bubbles. Even so, Italy, for example, has a rather tame deficit even today. But because it has a high debt to GDP ratio, much of it short term, a rise in rates spearheaded by speculative fears becomes very expensive in the near term. Indeed, if governments made an error, it was taking on too much short-term debt that needed constant rolling over, and the U.S. Is no exception. Remember when the Clinton administration, with the encouragement of Alan Greenspan, eliminated its 30-year benchmark Treasury bond?

In contrast to the narrow-minded ECB, as noted, the Federal Reserve immediately poured money into the U.S. And world economy (by cutting rates sharply, buying Treasury securities, and guaranteeing money market liabilities and other instruments) when Lehman Brothers fell apart -- and to a lesser degree earlier. Even when Europe established a new facility, the European Financial Stability Facility, to lend money in 2011, Germany restricted it from borrowing from the ECB. The EFSF should be expanded, without question. Some resist that idea, most prominently Germany, although Germany is now under recessionary pressure itself and seems to be relenting somewhat.

That is unconditional good news. The success of the Draghi plan shows how unfortunate the stringency has been. Nations that set their own monetary policy, like the U.K., have not had a run-up in rates because the central bank can in effect print money, and has.

These nations can also devalue their currencies. Even the U.S. Dollar has fallen, if probably not enough. The essence of the euro crisis is that members cannot devalue or control their own monetary policy.

But the ECB could have done so. If it had recognized its obligations, the crisis would not have been nearly as great.

(There are some legal restrictions as well, which I believe could have been disregarded, much as Germany and France once disregarded the legal restriction of a deficit ratio of 3 percent without suffering the prescribed penalties.) Even so, a more enlightened and courageous ECB would still not have been enough. The eurozone needed fiscal stimulus, much like the Obama stimulus provided, though Europe needed more (the U.S. Needed a second round as well). Instead, however, Europe got the opposite: austerity. In return for a Greek bailout from obstinate and ostrich-like Europe, its rates soaring partly because the ECB wouldn't serve as lender of last resort as it does in other nations like the U.K.

And U.S., the EU tough guys demanded public spending cutbacks, firing of thousands of public workers, reduced minimum wages, and on. Greece is now essentially in a depression imposed with remarkable callousness by the core eurozone members. Portugal, Spain, and Italy also have had austerity explicitly or implicitly imposed on them as part of a bailout deal. All are in recession today. Those who imposed the austerity, led by the Dutch, the Germans, and to a degree the Sarkozy supporters in France, assumed a dog would be able to catch its tail. Austerity meant weakening incomes, as Keynes long ago taught us, and lower incomes meant lower tax revenues.

When you missed your deficit target, you had to cut spending again, which led to weakening tax revenues again. Government spending couldn't drop fast enough to meet a deficit target in any of those countries.

Almost everyone knew this was about to happen. But the imposers of austerity believed this would wring these economies of excessive debt, reduce interest rates and wages, and create a new platform from which to grow.

Thus, they believed in family economics, not country economics. Tightening the belt may often work at home, but it means disaster for a country. Also strongly suggests that austerity's pain is delivered unequally.

Wages go down farther than profits and stay down longer. Long-term unemployment rises and many do not return to work. Here's the kicker: Germany is now in recession because austerity economics has so undermined the economies of those that import goods from it. It, too, is suffering. Did it really think it was immune to the process? Its success depended in the 2000s on the very free-spending economies it now disparages. Now the beggar-thy-neighbor consequences of their export-led growth model are at last taking a toll.

It is possible that Greece will say to heck with it, we won't pay our debts and would rather leave the euro. That would produce harsh pain all around.

But the Germans don't want a breakdown of the euro -- they benefit too much from a fixed euro that is too low given its unit labor costs. If Germany were independent, its currency would have soared already. Someone has to earn enough money to pay for the goods you make. Germany's repressed wages would never have provided it the market adequate to supports its manufacturing growth. Such export-led growth models are not sustainable.

What Europe needs is a far more generous ECB and the end of austerity economics for now. It also needs Germany and others to raise government spending to stimulate the region. And finally, everyone should get over their obsessions with tiny Greece. Europe should treat the troubled country as an obligation, much as the U.S. Carried the economies of the deep South for so long after World War II. Make Greece the ward of the state, supply it transfer social funds, help it get its house in better order, but don't suppress the spirit and hopes of democracy.

The deepening, austerity-induced recession in Europe will also take a toll on the U.S. If it makes it still harder for the southern periphery to pay its debts as bond investors get scared off, a new financial crisis could occur. This would affect the U.S., which has exposure to European debt, especially in money market mutual funds. A new recession is not impossible in America. Will Europe wake up? Will Germany be forced to face reality as it, too, suffers recessions? Can someone come forward with the guts to take a constructive stand other than Draghi, who disguises it in technicalities and sometimes talks up austerity himself?

Perhaps they are now expanding their 'firewall,' the money available for a bailout. But others are complaining Spain is backtracking on austerity. That is the return of the ostrich. It is a fascinating historical period -- or would be if it weren't so potentially tragic. The eurozone now practices pre-Depression economics. Cutting debts through spending contraction will reduce interest rates and labor costs enough to restore business investment, they say.

Economies self-adjust! That is their song -- or their swan song. And we heard it most loudly in the early 1930s. The approach won't work. Worse, it is already clearly not working. But many persist. They say, accept the necessary pain. They even say, share the pain, the best societies do.

But pain is not shared under austerity economics, it is borne by the less advantaged. Perhaps the explanation of this perverse economic policy is simply that the elite won't suffer themselves -- the middle and working class will. But eventually everyone will.

The world has suffered the insensitivity of elites many times before. Think of those World War I generals sending their working class soldiers to their deaths by the millions. Perhaps not death this time. But it is the same elitist distance from reality, the same elitist insensitivity. And it is called courage by them and by many in the media.. The 10 Worst Economic Ideas of 2011 Roosevelt Institute Senior Fellow; author, 'Age of Greed' I was at an Occupy Wall Street demonstration this weekend and many clergy addressed the group. One nun told the crowd it was Christmas season and that it was time for something new to be born in America.

It was a nice thought, and I hope that the 'something new' is good sense, because it has been a year in which some of the worst economic ideas ever have gained support and are being applied around the world. So here's my list of the 10 worst economic ideas of 2011: 1. Taxes should be more regressive.

At the top of the list for sheer scandalous insensitivity are Herman Cain's and New Gingrich's tax plans for America. Cain and Gingrich are both flat tax advocates. Cain proposes '9-9-9' -- a 9 percent sales tax, 9 percent income tax, and 9 percent corporate tax. He would also eliminate most deductions. Would this raise more or less money? The romantic conservatives claim the lower income tax rate would mean more growth. Never mind that the evidence to support that claim has been found profoundly lacking time and again.

What is eyebrow-raising is how regressive the Cain tax would be. According to the, those who make more than $1 million would get a tax cut of about $455,000 on average. Those who make between $40,000 and $50,000 would get a tax increase of about $4,400. The tax rate would be 23.8 percent for this group, compared to 17.9 percent for those who make $1 million or more.

Cain's plan might take in as much money as is now taken in by the federal government. But Gingrich's plan wins the gold medal: his plan is. His flat tax is 15 percent on incomes, with plenty of deductions like the one for mortgage interest still intact. He would eliminate taxes on capital gains and dividends. Those who earn more than $1 million would make out like bandits, saving an average of more than $600,000 a year, while those earning $50,000 a year would save about $1,000. Meanwhile, the government would forego about $1 trillion in annual revenues by 2015.

Austerity works. Is it conceivable that we have learned nothing from history -- or from economic theory, for that matter? It is hard to believe that after a year or so of the momentary return of in the wake of the deep recession of 2007-2009, it has been utterly renounced in practice in most rich nations around the world. Refuses to adopt a new fiscal stimulus as fears of a long-term deficit now determine short-term policy. The eurozone's decision makers are. Germany is leading the pack by imposing harsh limits on deficits as a percent of GDP on member states, which is sure to lead to slow growth and probably growing deficits. In the near term, the refusal to restructure the debt of the southern periphery along with demands for harsh austerity there could lead to a break-up of the eurozone and general catastrophe.

The conventional wisdom, however wrong-headed, is widely accepted in the media. Britain is imposing austerity and its economy only gets weaker, yet a recent Financial Times article for economic enlightenment compared to France because it is more willing to punish itself. John Banville, the estimable Irish novelist, in The New York Times that Ireland is now considered the 'good boy' of Europe because of its intense austerity program. I am not sure he was being ironic.

In fact, despite a couple of spikes in GDP, austerity is failing there as well. GDP and GNP (which is relevant because so much of their income is export-dependent) are way below their highs of a couple of years ago in Ireland. IMF economists have recently produced putting the lie to claims that austerity has led to rapid growth in some countries in the past. It almost never has, and in the couple of cases it has, it was because the countries devalued their currencies sharply to promote exports. Of course, there will be no devaluations in the eurozone. Export growth models are sustainable.

Germany is especially proud that it has exported its way to becoming the strong man of Europe. It has, used subsidies to make its products more competitive, and, set at too low a rate to maintain trade balances.

It is determined to remain oblivious to the fact that such a model requires countries that buy its products to run deficits and therefore borrow lots of money. This is why export models are known as beggar-thy-neighbor models, and it is why Germany has a moral obligation to help bail out nations like Greece, Italy, and Spain. Export models are really debt models on a global scale. China also runs on an export model, and the U.S.

Borrows relentlessly from it. But China occasionally seems to recognize that this model may not be sustainable and is trying to raise wages and reduce imbalances some.

More to the point, unlike Germany, it is now prepared to increase fiscal stimulus. This doesn't mean China gets an A for policy -- more like a C.

But Germany gets an F, and its low-wage export model cannot be adopted by all of Europe. Someone has to be able to afford to buy something.

Fannie and Freddie did it. A lawsuit by the Securities and Exchange Commission has revived the argument that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the causes of the housing collapse and the financial crisis. The SEC is suing high-level executives for failing to disclose that they had more sub-prime loans than they admitted. In fact, by the actual definition for subprimes that was commonly used, they probably did make these disclosures. But they also piled on risky mortgages in 2006 and 2007, not to meet affordable lending goals as some claim, but to make a profit. Frank Partnoy and I in the New York Review of Books. The problem was not Fannie and Freddie.

The crisis was created by the highly risky mortgages bought and sold by the private sector between 2003 and 2006, when Fannie and Freddie were cutting back their activities. They became big buyers when the damage was already done. And even now, their mortgage defaults as a percentage of their portfolios, despite the devastation in the housing market, are much lower than defaults in the private sector. Those who want to blame the government for the crisis keep coming back to this stale and very misleading issue. And as for the SEC, can it be that the only case they can drum up against high-level executives is at Fannie and Freddie? You mean at Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Lehman, Goldman, and so on? Cutting Social Security benefits is a priority.

We have a very long-term deficit problem, not a short-term one. Social Security did not contribute to the short-term deficit -- the Bush tax cuts, the recession, and the slow recovery are the main culprits over the next 10 years. But even in the longer run, Social Security benefits will rise from a little under 5 percent of GDP to 6 percent of GDP. Cutting these benefits and any deficit can be fixed with affordable tax increases. So why is everyone focusing on Social Security? Because it is the low-hanging fruit.

The really big problems, like Medicare and Medicaid, are driven by a dysfunctional healthcare system, and that is too hard to fix. It is a little like Reagan invading Grenada and calling it a great American victory.

Inflation is just around the corner. Remember the claims by the right wing that all that Federal Reserve stimulus in 2008 and 2009, not to mention the Obama spending bill, would lead to big-time inflation?

Nothing would be better than a little inflation in the U.S. Right now, but the economy has been too weak to deliver it. Bring on some inflation, please.

The Medicare eligibility age should be raised. Reports had it that President Obama had to raise the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67. Indeed, a New York Times editorial recently seemed (a little less than wholeheartedly).

Yes, this might reduce Medicare expenditures, but it would raise the total amount Americans spend on health care. In fact, the Kaiser Family Foundation figures it would for most of the seniors leaving Medicare by more than $2,000 a year on average. There would be other cost-raising effects, as, for example, healthier seniors left Medicare. Kaiser figures the increase in total health spending by Americans would be twice the amount of savings to Medicare. And of course some seniors would simply give up coverage.

Call it triage. Competition between Medicare and private health insurance will reform the health care system and reduce costs.

Say it ain't so, Ron Wyden. The Democratic senator from Oregon has with Congressman Paul Ryan to propose an option for Medicare recipients to buy private plans. They would be offered a flat payment to buy private plans if they so chose. Competition for these dollars will supposedly make Medicare and the health insurance companies more efficient. More likely, however, it will result in misleading claims by the health insurance companies or reduced coverage plans. It will raise costs for Medicare as healthy seniors are induced to take cheaper private plans with healthier individuals.

Allegedly, the Wyden-Ryan plan would control for all this by setting minimal standards. Forget about that. The Obama administration has already on federal standards for Obamacare, letting states set their own. Guess who most of the states will favor. Seniors will probably have to move to New York or Massachusetts to get decent plans. But that's not even the big rub.

It is that Medicare payments will be limited to growing just 1 percent faster than GDP. Health care costs have risen considerably faster than that for a long time. Somehow Wyden thinks that such a limit will force reforms.

In sum, it will simply lead to less coverage and more expense for beneficiaries. Federal spending should be capped at 21 percent of GDP.

The president's Simpson-Bowles budget balancing commission because it is the average for the last 40 years. How's that for reasoning? With fast-rising health care costs and an aging population, such a limit is patent nonsense. For a nation that needs significant investment in infrastructure, energy savings, and education, it is especially damaging.

There is no evidence to support the claim that such a cap would promote economic growth. An alternative plan offered by Rivlin and Domenici at least to about 23 percent, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. The whopper is the House Republican plan to adopt a to the Constitution.

It would reduce federal expenditures to 18 percent of the previous year's GDP, meaning more like a 16.5 percent cap. This would change America as we know it, testing the nation's political stability with harsh cuts in social spending and precluding any serious public investment in the nation's economic foundations. Balancing the budget should involve equal parts tax hikes and government spending cuts.

This is not economics; it is politics. But economists argue for it all the time as if it is good economics, not admitting their conservative bias that high taxes are bad for growth and government social and investment spending never helps. Most of the major budget balancing plans of 2010 and 2011 argued for more spending cuts than revenue increases. The Bowles-Simpson plan is comprised of two-thirds spending cuts, one-third revenue increases. Obama's budget plan last spring also had much more in spending cuts than tax increases.

Only the Rivlin-Domenici plan was balanced. The one conspicuous exception was the plan from the Congressional Progressive Caucus, which of course got short shrift in the press. It was about two thirds tax increases to one third program cuts. Pubblicato in,,,,,,,,,,,. The inconsistency between war as a moral imperative versus political policy runs way wider and deeper than the Libya conflict. It goes to the heart of human nature and the character of society.

For despite the popular delusion that war is primarily a matter of political strategy and pragmatic execution, it almost never is. Squaring the circle of war and politics, morality and material interests, is not just Obama's or America's quandary, it is a species-wide dilemma that results from wanting to believe that we humans are fundamentally rational beings, when in fact David Hume was right to say that 'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.' Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists Anthropologist; Author, 'Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists' In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (Evolution and Cognition Series). THE ORIGINS OF GLOBALIZATION: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE by Karl Moore and David Lewis It is somewhat of a conceit to claim that globalization is a relatively recent phenomenon.

In fact, globalization has a long and storied past that goes back to the first ships and land caravans. This past, like those in other domains, can be instructive, especially for large trading nations today. These authors, whose book on the origins of globalization has just been published, describe some of the important events and patterns that shaped globalization in another time. Can Canadians in the 21st century gain anything from studying the economy of the ancient world? Many historians recognize that the postindustrial American global economy that arose in the 1980’s and 1990’s was the most recent one in a series of global economies. Its immediate forerunner dominated the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Canada played an important part in a free-trading global system that interlocked with the British Empire.

Even this ‘industrial’ global economy was preceded by an agricultural global economy that began with the Age of Discovery in the late 1400’s, 1500’s and 1600’s. Quebec, then known as New France, played an important role in this global economy and in the four key wars between 1689 and 1763 that decided who would run its North American outpost. Does globalization go back even further? Medieval traders linked Europe, Africa and Asia, and sent Vikings to Canada’s shores. Can the origins of globalization be traced back to antiquity, to the beginnings of trade and investment itself? We believe they can, but only if historians are careful.

Ancient economies were very different from our own. The fur traders of New France, however, would easily have recognized their operations. Modern economists usually ignore the businesses and trading networks of bygone centuries as having no lessons for us today. They were just too primitive and too different. Temples, gift exchanges, and subsistence farming seem to have little in common with a sophisticated economy with its scientific calculation of risk, profit, and productivity.

The irrelevance of ancient economies for modern business was laid down by Sir Moses Finley in the 1970’s and became unchallenged orthodoxy in most universities. Finley made a strong case for the Greeks he studied but he was on shakier ground when it came to the Romans. By the early 2000’s a group of mostly British scholars began to argue that some features of ‘primitive’ Roman economies did point to more ‘modern’ developments. In our newest book, The Origins of Globalization we pose the question of whether a global economy existed in the ancient world. Clearly, Canada and Australia were not part of it, nor were the Olmecs in Mexico.

When we consider Europe, Africa and Asia we are on much stronger ground in finding a ‘known world economy’. If we define globalization as ‘hemispherization,’ we can make a good case for the origins of globalization in a trading economy that stretched from Spain to China. The history of ancient economies may be looked at as a series of baby steps towards the global economy of today. Each new development built upon previous ones. Long-distance trade traces far back into the Stone Age.

Before 3000 BCE, city life rose up in Sumer in Southern Iraq. First the temple and then the royal palace became the public sector and trading posts were set up on the fringes of the Fertile Crescent. These were the first foreign, permanent establishments.

Private merchants developed gradually over the long centuries and extended their trade to the Indus Valley, Egypt and the Aegean. By 1800 BCE, merchants and common people in the city of Ur were speculating on copper futures in Bahrein.and were wiped out in the first stock market crash. The Assyrians set up family firms that ran profit-seeking subsidiaries many miles away, in Asia Minor and Babylonia. The House of Ashur-Imitti operated from northern Iraq with family members running branches in faraway cities such as Carchemish, Kanesh, and Hattusas, today in Syria and Turkey. This was the first step in the emergence of a multinational as we know it and this model soon became standard through the whole Middle East. Kingdoms signed treaties governing the acts of resident foreign merchants. The Phoenicians of Ugarit and then Tyre, ancestors of the Lebanese, took the next step: maritime capitalism.

Royal princes, private merchants and naval officers joined hands in managing overseas ventures. Markets were sought and establishments set up in Cyprus, Malta, Carthage, Sicily, Sardinia and in Spain. The axis of world trade shifted into the Mediterranean. Founded a network of establishments stretching from Cadiz in Spain to Nineveh in Assyria.

Each of these establishments operated like a primitive version of the Hudson’s Bay Company. Much of this network later continued under Carthaginian supervision.

Greece, India and China The Greeks started out much like other ancient peoples, with kings and managed palace economies that seemed more socialist than capitalist. Something unusual nevertheless happened among the hundreds of islands and peninsulae in the Aegean. The early kingdoms fragmented into over 1,000 independent states. Each of these states became an independent republic run first by landowners, then by tyrants.

Some, like Athens, became the world’s first democracy. The Greeks became history’s first entrepreneurial capitalists. Here there were no merchant princes, only independent traders competing in overseas markets. Ancient Greece bore a remarkable resemblance to the British Empire/Commonwealth. If Tyrian colonists behaved like the state-sponsored settlers of New France, the Greeks behaved like the English and others who came to Upper Canada and then the Prairies in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Farmers from city states such as Corinth founded whole new colonies, such as Syracuse in Sicily, that were completely self-governing. Sicily, Southern Italy, and the Greek colonies along the Aegean and Black Seas became the Albertas and Saskatchewans of the Greek world. The cheap grain they shipped back to their founding cities soon forced Corinthian and other farmers to adapt to globalization. Many became traders themselves or started growing wine, oranges and olives.

Like the farmers of Ontario, they turned from grain to mixed farming. The Greeks soon faced a challenge from Persia. The Persians unified a vast empire and adapted the infrastructure of Assyria and Babylonia as their own. This empire had everything from Babylonian bankers and Ionian Greeks to Indians. They took the first step in cross-cultural management. In effect they were linking Europe to Asia. India entered the global economy at a very early date.

The well-planned cities of the Indus Valley developed a managed trading system not unlike that of their trading partners in the Middle East. Indian socialism, an economy of private managers and strong governmental supervision, itself has 4,000-year-old roots.

Did ancient India invent supply-side economics? One could make the case.

A manual for economic planning and political policy known as the Arthashastra was written sometime around 100 CE. Business enterprise was to be run by the caste of the Vaishya, but heavily regulated by the local rajah in the interest of his kingdom.

Kautilya, author of the Arthashastra, displayed little use for laissez-faire. Taxes were necessary to maintain the health of the kingdom. On the other hand, if taxes were too high, it would be the ruin of the kingdom.

Any royal official who taxed his subjects to excess ought to be severely punished. Unlike the Indian model, the earliest Chinese model forbade private enterprise. From 1800 BCE until well into the first millennium BCE, every aspect of the Chinese economy was subject to total state control. Unlike in the Middle East or India, private merchant princes and nongovernmental, voluntary organizations were suffocated by an all-powerful central government. Eventually, private entrepreneurs rose up in China but they did so in the only way they could in a low-trust society: in the context of the family. Extended Chinese families were huge and provided the markets for traders fearful of trusting anyone they did not know.

Despite its original lack of market freedom, China was nonetheless far ahead of the rest of the world in technology and management theory. Where much of Indian thought focused on the afterlife, Chinese thought was oriented to extreme practicality. When the Zhou dynasty crumbled around 600 BCE, thinkers wrestled with how best to manage society. Their theories could be applied to private as well as public management. Confucius argued for beneficial management. If you treated those under you well, they would love, revere and respect you.

Laozi set up the philosophical basis for the free market: if you followed the laws of nature and left things alone and didn’t meddle, things would be better. Han Fei formulated the theory of fear management and absolute control. Shihuangdi, the feared Dragon Emperor, used Han Fei’s management style to unify China by mass terror and thought control. Centuries later Mao Zedong wrote poems in his honor. When the Dragon Emperor died, his successors freed up Chinese society and sought to end China’s isolation from the world. Rome On the other end of the Eurasian land mass the tribes of the Italian boot encountered the Greeks and the Tyrians and began to borrow from their business practices. If the Greeks paved the way for the British Empire, the Romans would pave the way for the American.

Last year, Thomas Madden published a fascinating book called Empires of Trust in which he compared the United States to the Roman Republic. The Romans were to some degree a frontier offshoot of Greek civilization. They rebelled against their kings and drew up their own written constitution, the Twelve Tables. Limited government, family values, free enterprise, and a disdain for snobbish intellectuals became the heart and core of the Roman citizen ideal.

One did not find temple capitalism in Rome, where religion was a family matter. So was Roman business. We have tended to see Roman expansion as a premeditated plot to conquer the world. It was nothing of the kind. Most of Rome’s wars were defensive and preventive, and many of her rivals wanted to join her. By 291 BCE, Rome ruled most of Italy and had turned most of her former enemies into allies and protectorates.

In 264 BCE, Rome was drawn into war with Carthage. The Punic Wars became a real clash of civilizations where the Latin culture of Rome faced the Near Eastern culture of Carthage. The wars with Carthage forged a mighty Roman entrepreneurism and a Roman military-industrial complex. Roman agents captured a Carthaginian warship and Roman companies bid for contracts to reverse engineer it. One bright Roman engineer attached an iron bridge to the new Roman warship that let Roman centurions turn into marines and slaughter their enemies by boarding their ships.

Rome won the first round and with it, Sicily. War broke out again in 218 BCE when the famous Carthaginian, General Hannibal, marched across the Alps and ravaged Italy. Unlike Rome, Carthage could not supply its forces. Rome won the war by launching a seaborne invasion of Carthage. Carthage made one final attempt to even the score in 149 BCE but she was quickly destroyed. Rome now ruled the whole western Mediterranean and quickly found herself drawn into the eastern Mediterranean. She was called in to defend the Greeks from Macedonia and wound up taking them over.

She inherited the entire Kingdom of Pergamum in Asia Minor and went on to absorb Syria, Judaea and Egypt. Most everyone wanted Roman protection. The Greeks were small, free-standing entrepreneurs. The Romans became large-scale entrepreneurs. Roman law banned aristocrats from forming businesses but allowed knights to do so.

Networks of knights, many of them related, formed huge partnerships and even elected a CEO. They were called societas republicanorum. A publican firm based in Italy hired agents to live in Greece or the Middle East and to represent it. According to Dr. Ulrike Malmendier of UC Berkeley, these publican companies were the first real corporations in history. They existed as legal persons with limited liability. They had shareholders and separated financial and managerial control.

The Romans had a strong private business sector. Markets were very important through the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire. Roman business history shows us that these markets were often created and sustained by government.

The most lucrative markets for a Roman publican were war and tax collecting. All the armaments for the legions were produced by publican firms under contract with the Senate and People of Rome. Equipping a legion of 5,000 centurions could generate a contract worth about $C15 million. A major war could generate as much as $C300 million in contracts.

Small wonder that the Roman business establishment took off and Roman knights became a force in the late Republic. Tax collecting was just as profitable. During the last decades of the Republic, many publican firms merged into huge cartels. Rome had her own robber barons.

Like many U.S. And Canadian firms today, Roman managers thought short- term. Middle managers had little job security, and staffs were as lean as possible.

As publican firms shifted from market to market, downsizing was common and frequent. Knights were hired and fired as the manceps (CEO) and socii (partners) saw fit. The rise of the publicans posed another danger for the Republic, when they began to finance the growth of private armies. Marius, Sulla, Crassus, Pompey, and Julius and Augustus Caesar all had legions loyal to them personally rather than to the Republic.

These legions all had their publican supporters. By 27 BCE, Octavian was sole master of the Roman World. Beginning around 120 BCE, all the pieces of the hemispheric economy started to come together. Rome absorbed all the territories around the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean.

When she conquered Egypt she gained control of the trade routes along the Red Sea. These trade routes were dominated by Greek entrepreneurs who sailed to Ethiopia and Arabia. In 120 BCE, the Greek explorer Eudoxus learned of the Southwest Monsoon that could bring Greeks from Egypt to India and the Northwest Monsoon that carried them home and brought Indians to Africa. Rome now inherited this market knowledge and Roman publicans busied themselves outfitting large, sturdy vessels that could carry as much as 300 tons of wine, silver and other Roman goods to India. Of course, they hired the Greeks to sail them.

The same ships could carry back bulk shipments of Indian spices and Chinese silk. With 300 ships a year sailing between Egypt and India, this annual trade may have reached 300,000 tons. This was a staggering sum for its day and may even have triggered an anti-globalization movement. Pliny the Elder complained that perhaps $C5 billion a year of Rome’s money was being drained to the east. Even Tiberius Caesar complained that the imports desired by Rome’s ladies were draining the wealth of the empire.

Roman traders even set up permanent establishments on the Indian shore opposite Sri Lanka. The site of Arikamedu was filled with Roman coins and jugs for shipping wine.

India’s own merchants became middlemen between the Yavanas, as the Greeks and Romans were called, and the Chinese who sailed west to meet them. While Rome came east, China came west. Seeking allies against the ancestors of the Huns, the Han Emperor Wu sent overland expeditions far to the west. They reached Iran and encountered the rulers of the Parthian Empire.

The Persian Empire had been conquered by the Macedonians and Greeks under Alexander and most of its territory passed to the rule of Alexander’s General Seleucus after his death. Between 248 and 150 BCE the lands of Iran and Iraq were conquered by a tribe of Scythian nomads called the Parthians. China and Parthia became trading partners.

Next, Parthia came in contact with Rome and fought several wars with her until an uneasy truce took hold in the middle of the first century BCE. The Parthians were fairly liberal and students of the Persian idea of cross-cultural management. They governed their conquered territories like dominions and left business in the hands of Babylonian bankers, Syrian long-distance caravan operators and Greek and Phoenician exporters.

India managed the sea route in the hemispheric economy; Parthia the overland route. Caravans from Syria crossed Iraq, Iran and Central Asia to glass, textiles and horse to China and bring silk. This ‘global’ economy was very limited by our standards but more extensive than anything that existed before.

Just as today, when there is far more trade within NAFTA or the EU than between the two blocs, there was far more trade within the Roman Empire, The Indian Subcontinent and Han China than among them. Then, as now, hemispherization/globalization was a fragile plant. Free trade depends on political stability. Political instability has doomed every ‘global’ economy in history. After 200 CE, the Han Empire broke apart. Parthia was overthrown by militant Zoroastrians who restored the Persian Empire and declared a holy war upon Rome. Rome herself began to totter under the weight of the Persians, Germans and unsustainable military expenditures.

Gate Keepers Anime Download Dub on this page. Business enterprise began to collapse. By 250, neither Rome nor China could afford to finance Indian or hemispheric trade.

Globalization is fragile Then, as now, hemispherization/globalization depended upon political stability. By the third century CE that stability was failing. The Han Empire in China broke up into three rival states. This began to hamper China’s trade with the West. Rome suffered even more turmoil. The empire became overextended and began to suffer from political instability. Parthia was overthrown by a militant new Persian empire that waged religious warfare against the Romans.

This closed most of the overland China trade to Rome. Rome in the third century CE faced a Persian-German threat and vastly increased her legions, equipping many with heavy cavalry. The new military expenditures triggered inflation.

After the last Severan Emperor died in 235 the expanded legions produced a succession of thirty emperors in fifty years. The empire dissolved until reunited by Aurelian. In 284 Diocletian stripped the last pretenses of republicanism from Rome, controlled wages and prices and forged a despotism that lasted for another century.

Roman companies could no longer finance direct Indian trade, and neither could China’s three warring kingdoms. Globalization is a fragile plant and the lesson of history in both antiquity and our day remains that it can be easily torn apart by regional and national political forces. Today regionalism remains a strong force whether with NAFTA, the EU or other regional trading blocks and pure global economies remain just as theoretical as pure free markets. A change of regime or a war can easily cause a global trading network to come upon the shoals.

We are hopeful that President Obama’s more multilateral approach will prove to be helpful in working in greater concert with other important economic powers to keep globalization a vital force even as it morphs into yet its next stage of evolution in its long and eventful history. Karl Moore is Associate Professor of Strategy and Organization, Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University,and Associate Fellow, Green Templeton College, Oxford University. David Lewis is an author who specializes in ancient business history. He teaches at Citrus College, Glendora, California.

This article is based on their new book The Origins of Globalization (Routledge, 2009). The globalisation of revolution Revolutions are caused by human agency; not telecommunications technologies, scholar argues Around the world, people are wondering what kind of example Egypt will provide in their future struggles for democracy and equality, says Tarak Barkawi To listen to the hype about social networking websites and the Egyptian revolution, one would think it was Silicon Valley and not the Egyptian people who overthrew Mubarak. Via its technologies, the West imagines itself to have been the real agent in the uprising. Since the internet developed out of a US Defense Department research project, it could be said the Pentagon did it, along with Egyptian youth imitating wired hipsters from London and Los Angeles. Most narratives of globalisation are fantastically Eurocentric, stories of Western white men burdened with responsibility for interconnecting the world, by colonising it, providing it with economic theories and finance, and inventing communications technologies. Of course globalisation is about flows of people as well, about diasporas and cultural fusion.

But neither version is particularly useful for organising resistance to the local dictatorship. In any case, the internet was turned off at decisive moments in the Egyptian uprising, and it was ordinary Egyptians, mothers and fathers, daughters and sons, who toppled the regime, not the hybrid youth of the global professional classes. Nothing new about globalisation Are there other tales of globalisation, perhaps those told by rebels and guerrillas?

Globalisation is also coming to awareness of the situations of other peoples, such as those similarly oppressed by local and faraway powers. Of particular interest are those moments when these peoples rise up, when they devise forms of revolt and struggle.

Defeats provide lessons, and victories give hope. These revolutions need not be on satellite TV to effect their instruction. Revolutionaries in France and Haiti in the 1790s received news of one another''s activities by the regular packet ship that plied between Jamaica and London. Sailors, slaves, and workers circulating in the Atlantic between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries shared and improved upon their repertoires of revolt and resistance, bringing the good news to ports from Rio to Boston, Bristol to Havana.

When Indians rose in revolt in 1857, Frederick Engels analysed their mistakes - like the Libyan rebels today, they were too eager to stand and fight against a better organised opponent. Engels publicised the uprising in a series of newspaper articles that ultimately inspired Mao Tse-tung's theories of guerrilla warfare, which went on to circulate as well-thumbed texts in the pockets of Vietnamese, Cuban, Algerian and other revolutionaries (and of those who sought to defeat them).

Before Mao, Chinese nationalists and intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century staged operas about the dismemberment of Poland and looked to the Boers, the Filipinos and others fighting imperialist oppressors, all in order to think through their own situation. This is the globalisation of revolution, and these are the histories within which the Tunisian example belongs, the example that so inspired the Egyptian people. News of it might as well have arrived in Egypt by caravan as by fiber optic cable, it would still have been electric, the very idea that the solitary stand of a fruit seller could bring down the big men. The agency was human, the act political.

But these are also histories of despair, self-immolation and tragedy. Few peoples have resisted as have the Vietnamese, but at what cost, and for the reward of delayed re-entry into the capitalist world system. It is a blessing that the voice of the Algerian revolution, Frantz Fanon, who hailed from Martinique, is not alive to see the state of Algeria today. Soon we may feel the same about Nelson Mandela, the conscience of South Africa’s struggle against apartheid, as his country sinks into the hands of a venal elite. China prospers, but has abandoned its revolution, its people paying a greater price for Mao's strategies in peace than they ever did in war. Post-revolution struggle It is no joke that revolutionaries face their greatest challenges after the revolution, and usually fail to meet them with sufficient humanity.

Having broken from the international order in their struggles for freedom, revolutionary countries have proved unable to negotiate a re-entry into that order on terms that allow them to flourish, while remaining true to their principles. The question now is what kind of example will Egypt provide, to its Arab sisters and brothers, and to present and future struggles for justice, liberty and democracy the world over. The democratic forces of Egypt must look to other countries to think through their complex struggles, against old regime elements at home, for a political and economic order that promises opportunity and justice, and for a foreign policy that balances realism with values. In doing so, Egyptians would do well to cease looking to the tired countries of Europe or to the United States for recognition and inspiration, and instead turn their attention to the other powers of the global South who face the same dilemmas, powers like Brazil, India, Turkey and Indonesia. Having dealt a mortal blow to the American-centreed order in the Middle East, Egypt must still find its way in the one world we all share, and regain its place as a great non-Western power. Tarak Barkawi is a senior lecturer in War Studies at the Centre of International Studies in the University of Cambridge. He also authored the book Globalization and War (Rowman and Littlefield).

He has held fellowships at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University; the Department of War Studies, King’s College London; the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University; and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Ohio State University. Globalization and War by Publisher Comments.

War doesn't just tear nations apart--it brings peoples and places closer together, providing a new lens on globalization. This book offers a fresh perspective on globalization and war, topics rarely considered together. It conceives war as a form of interconnection between home and abroad, and as an occasion for circulation and interchange.

It identifies the political and military work required to create and maintain a free-trading world, while critiquing liberal and neoliberal conceptions of the pacific benefits of economic globalization. Speaking from the heart of old and new imperial orders, Tarak Barkawi exposes the Eurocentric limitations of military history and highlights the imperial dimensions of modern warfare. Britain, India, and the colonial Indian army exemplify the intertwined, global histories illuminated by attention to globalization and war.

Around the world, geographies and wars are imagined differently. Cultural approaches to globalization show how popular consciousness of the world often takes military and warlike form, and how militaries spawn hybrid traveling cultures wherever they go. Finally, Barkawi examines the contemporary war on terror using historical and non-Eurocentric globalizations to clarify the politics and strategies involved in the purported 'clash of civilizations'. Adding a new layer of understanding, he looks at the globalization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the intensifying Israelization of the United States. Book News Annotation. Examining the interconnections between globalization and war, Barkawi (Centre of International Studies, U.

Of Cambridge, UK) first analyzes how war interconnects and reshapes places and how developments in the nature and utility of military force shape transregional and worldwide contexts, utilizing the relations among India, the British empire, and the Indian Army is illustrative material. He then examines cultural dimensions of war and globalization such as 'geographic imaginaries' of a modern and advance West and a barbarous Orient. The themes developed in these chapters are then applied to the 'War on Terror.' Globalization in World History [Paperback] (Editor) Recent world events, especially the terrorist attacks on the United States and the evolving conflicts in the Middle East, have sparked wider concern for global issues in general. There is now a flood of literature on the economics, politics, and sociology of globalization and regular commentary in the serious daily and weekly press. Virtually all of this discussion makes assumptions, and frequently explicit claims, about the novelty of globalization. According to one view, globalization is a new phenomenon that can be dated from the 1980s.

A second view holds that globalization has a long history that can be traced to the nineteenth century, if not earlier. These are important claims, but until now they had not attracted significant critical attention from historians. This volume is the first by a team of historians to address these issues. Globalization in World History has two distinctive features. First, it traces the history of globalization across nearly three centuries.

Second, it emphasizes a feature that the current debate greatly underestimates: the fact that globalization has non-Western as well as Western origins. Globalization is much more than a new way to tell the all-too-familiar 'rise of the West' story. The contributors bring their expertise to bear on themes that give prominence to China, South Asia, Africa, and the world of Islam, as well as to Europe and the United States; these themes span the last three centuries while also showing an awareness of more distant antecedents. The result is a coherent and thought-provoking collection of essays. Globalization will become a major theme of historical research during the next decade; this book will help set the new agenda. GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY is an excellent book and, contrary to what some reviewers suggest, is one of the best historical studies of globalization available. The true significance of GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY is that it was the first attempt by historians to bring a broader and longer perspective to the history of globalization.

Hopkins, the editor, begins the book by underlining the growing urgency of the question of globalization, which has been made plain by terrorist attacks around the world, by conflict in the Middle East, and by the changes caused by expanding global trade. Such a pressing issue thus demands a thoughtful analysis. But scholarship on globalization has been dominated by economists, journalists, and political commentators who are primarily concerned with present events, while existing historical commentary has largely failed to approach the history of globalization with a sufficiently broad perspective. The authors of the nine essays that constitute this book seek to correct this gap in knowledge by emphasizing the non-Western origins of globalization and by expanding its inquiry to cover the last 300 years. The hope of the editor is 'to reinvigorate the appraisal of large slices of the past,' and 'to link history to the present in ways that ought to inform the appraisal of contemporary issues'.

It is therefore misleading, indeed unfair, to call this book an 'academic indictment of American scholars,' as Mr. Finconsult has - a gross exaggeration that suggests he never made it past the second chapter. Finconsult, as a former Oxford student, should understand that where there is a scholarly imbalance, a corrective is necessary. GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY attempts to provide this balance by emphasizing the non-Western as well as the Western sources of globalization, and by searching for earlier sources of globalization that, prior to 1945, had begun the process that since then has become associated with American preeminence. It is also strange that Mr. Finconsult should accuse the book of lacking an economic dimension when the editor, A.G. Hopkins, is the author of AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA, a book that pioneered the study of economic history in the under-developed world, and when the same editor is the author of BRITISH IMPERIALISM, 1688-2000, a book of enormous importance that, more than any other work, returned economic considerations to the forefront of imperial history.

Finconsult also missed the many references to economics in the individual essays in the book. The third chapter by C.A. Bayly concludes that, 'already, in the period 1750-1850, features of proto-globalization based on the supremacy of market-driven, profit-maximizing forces emanating from Euro-American capitalism and the nation state were already apparent' (if resisted by old social and cultural formations). Similar developments are suggested in the fourth chapter, by Amira Bennison, who argues that 'international economic exchanges, migrations, and global ideologies within and without state structures are not the sole preserve of late twentieth century or early twenty-first-century Western societies but have been developed, promoted, and upheld by many world systems which, although not necessarily global in reach, certainly maintained universal, and thus global, aspirations.' Or, take for example the fifth chapter by Richard Drayton, which considers New World sugar plantations as part of the 'cutting edge of capitalist civilization,' and as a 'complex' that attracted investment, employed labor, created consumption, and 'generated global circuits of bullion, sugar, cotton, wheat, beef, and debt, and cycles of colonial expansion and European settlement on every continent.' These examples could be repeated for the remaining six chapters, but the point is clear enough: GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY is a remarkably rich and well-balanced account of the history of globalization that, far from discounting economic forces, in fact places them center stage.

It is equally curious that one would accuse the authors of attacking either the United States or American scholarship on globalization, when the final chapter by David Reynolds begins with an acknowledgement that last century was indeed the 'American Century,' and that modern technology created a 'multiplier effect' that makes American globalization uniquely influential in world history. Reynolds's only hint of challenging American scholarship is to point out that few economists, sociologists, or political scientists have looked beyond WWII, and that 'a longer historical perspective is therefore appropriate' if scholars are to understand globalization as more than simply an American phenomenon. 'It is a fundamental aim,' he writes, 'to locate contemporary globalization in broader and longer contexts, by showing the globalizing patterns of other societies and earlier epochs.' Finally, it is regrettable that some readers consider this book an 'extremely intellectual' and 'impossible' read. There is - inevitably - some truth to the claim that the book is highly intellectual and that its authors write in a distinctive Cambridge style. But this should hardly be surprising (or difficult) for any reader familiar with the authors' work or with the literature on globalization by scholars from other fields. As a point of comparison, I would suggest reading the commendable, if densely written, work on the subject by Ian Clark, or by David Held and Anthony McGrew, et al.

You might then discover that, in content as well as stylistic felicity, GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY is a refreshing, timely, and highly important study of the history of globalization. This collection of timely articles is the first to explore the dynamics between globalization and education from a specifically Canadian perspective.

The articles engage with emergent debates and new discourses around global orientations to citizenship education currently defining scholarly work and teaching practices in Canada. This book will, therefore, be of great interest to Canadian teacher educators who are seeking to infuse a global perspective into their pre-service programs as well as to globally-oriented undergraduate and graduate course instructors from a range of scholarly disciplines both in Canada and elsewhere. The Canadian perspective proves to be, not surprisingly, global in essence. The articles contained in Citizenship Education in the Era of Globalization: Canadian Perspectives map the history of citizenship, citizenship education and global studies and probe the notion of global citizenship for its possibilities and impossibilities. Recognizing the importance of engaging with the lives of students and teachers, the contributions also include articles reporting on research and theory about such topics as the complexities of second-generation youth identity and the extent to which mainstream teachers can bring global citizenship education into their classrooms. The collection presents an engaging look into the theory and practice of citizenship education in Canada during a time when bringing global issues to the classroom is an imperative of democratic schooling.

Pubblicato in,,,,,,,,,. Denial: Overcome denial by taking action and moving forward Denial is an unconscious coping mechanism that grants you time to adjust to a distressing situation. But when denial goes too far, it can interfere with treatment or moving forward. When you accuse someone of being in denial, you generally mean it in a negative way.

You think that someone isn't being realistic about something that needs to be addressed directly — something that's very obvious to you. Indeed, when someone's in denial, he or she appears to be pretending that something isn't happening or isn't true. In some cases, though, a little denial can be a good thing. Being in denial for a short period can be a healthy coping mechanism because it provides time to adjust to a painful or stressful issue. On the other hand, denial does have its dark side. It can prevent someone from effectively dealing with issues that require action and change, such as getting treatment for an addiction or cancer. Find out how denial can help and how it can also be a roadblock to good health.

This way, you can help make sure you and loved ones aren't in denial about denial. Understanding denial and its purpose Denial is a common type of defense mechanism that occurs as part of an automatic psychological process. Denial is a way of dealing with emotional conflict, stress, painful thoughts, threatening information and anxiety by refusing to acknowledge facts that are obvious to others — in essence, denying the existence of a problem. Denial occurs in a variety of situations, such as mental illness, cancer, chronic illness, terminal illness and addiction. In its strictest sense, denial is considered to be an unconscious process.

That is, someone doesn't choose to be in denial. However, some research studies do suggest that denial may sometimes have a conscious component — someone may deliberately choose to be in denial. In either case, someone in denial: Refuses to acknowledge certain situations Avoids the facts of the situation Minimizes the consequences of the situation Other defense mechanisms Denial isn't the only defense mechanism in psychological theory. Other types include: Rationalization. Dealing with stressful situations or emotional conflicts by hiding the real reasons for actions and thoughts with elaborate but incorrect explanations. Dealing with stressful situations or emotional conflicts by unconsciously banishing all awareness of painful experiences, thoughts and feelings — as if they never happened.

Dealing with stressful situations or emotional conflicts by deliberately avoiding thinking about them, while not actually denying the existence of a problem. Situations in which denial may be helpful It may seem that refusing to face the facts is never a healthy way to cope. In some cases, though, a short period of denial may be beneficial. Being in denial gives your mind the opportunity to unconsciously absorb shocking or distressing information at a pace that won't send you into a psychological tailspin. For instance, after a traumatic or stressful event, you may need several days or weeks to fully process what's happened. Being in denial gives you time to come to grips with the challenges that lie ahead. Consider, for instance, what might happen when a woman discovers a lump in her breast one night as she's lying in bed.

She feels a rush of fear and adrenaline as she imagines it's breast cancer and immediately leaps to the conclusion that she's going to die. So she decides to ignore the lump, hoping it'll go away on its own. But when it hasn't gone away two weeks later, she consults her doctor. This type of denial is healthy and is considered an adaptive — or helpful — response to stressful information. The woman initially denied the distressing problem, and then as her mind absorbed it, she came to approach it more rationally, and a short time later, she took action by seeking help.

Situations in which denial may be harmful But what if the woman had continued to be in denial about finding the lump and tried to forget about it entirely? What if she never sought help? In cases like that, where denial persists and prevents you from getting appropriate treatment, it's considered a maladaptive — or harmful — response. Some examples of unhealthy denial: A college student witnesses a violent shooting but claims he's not affected by it. An older man just diagnosed with liver cancer tells his doctor that he's wrong and leaves without treatment. A businessman periodically misses a morning meeting after drinking excessively the night before but insists he's still getting all his work done, so he doesn't have a problem. A young woman is ringing up so much credit card debt that she tosses all the bills in the trash because she can't bear to open them.

A man has heart attack symptoms but refuses to believe it's anything but indigestion and doesn't call for help. Denial in situations like these is harmful. It prevents you from getting appropriate treatment, counseling or care, with potentially devastating long-term consequences Finding a healthy balance with denial When faced with an overwhelming turn of events, it's OK to say, 'I just can't think about all of this right now.' This gives you time to work through what's happened and adapt to new circumstances. But it's also important to realize that denying or avoiding the facts is still a state of mind. It won't change the reality of the situation.

So how can you make sure denial over something upsetting in your life isn't hurting you? It may be hard to see that you're in denial, especially if it's become extreme or long-term. If you feel stuck or if someone you trust suggests that you're in denial, try these strategies: Honestly ask yourself what you fear. Think about the potential negative consequences of not taking action.

Allow yourself to express your fears and emotions. Try to identify the irrational beliefs about your situation. Journal about your experience. Open up to a trusted confidante.

Find a support group. When you need help moving beyond denial If you don't seem to be making much progress dealing with a stressful situation on your own — you're stuck in the denial phase — consider talking to a mental health provider. He or she can help you find healthy ways of coping with the situation rather than trying to pretend it doesn't exist When a loved one needs help moving beyond denial You may find it incredibly frustrating when someone you care about is in denial about an important issue, whether it's health, finances or relationships. Template Skull Cinema 4d R16. Before demanding that your loved one face the facts, take a step back.

Try to determine if all he or she needs is a little time and space to work through the issue, without forcing a confrontation. At the same time, let the person know that you're open to talking about the subject, even if it makes both of you slightly uncomfortable. Often, people facing distressing issues fear that those close to them will be unable to cope and will abandon them. So, make sure your loved one knows you're available, no matter what happens.

Ultimately, this may give him or her the security needed to move forward and take action. If your loved one is in denial about a serious health issue, such as depression, cancer or an addiction, broaching the issue may be especially difficult. Offer support and empathetic listening.

Don't try to force someone to seek treatment, which could lead to angry confrontations. Offer to meet together with a doctor or mental health provider. Try not to unleash angry emotions on your loved one.

If the impasse remains, consider counseling for yourself so that you can cope better with your distress and frustration. Pubblicato in,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.