Who Killed Hemant Kar Kare Ebook Login
Dec 11, 2009. The CST-Cama Hospital-Rangabhavan Lane episode of the attack is mysterious because Maharashtra's most famous ATS chief, Hemant Karkare, noted for bravery, impartiality and efficiency, was shot dead here at the instance of IB to save the notorious Brahminists involved in the Malegaon bombing.
Nirupama Subramanian For all its claims to represent the people’s will, the Pakistan government today finds itself isolated in its apparent willingness and sincerity to cooperate with India. Can the Asif Ali Zardari government in Pakistan deliver on its earnestly made promise to “cooperate fully” with India in the Mumbai terror attacks investigation?
This is the million dollar question that India and the rest of the world are asking as evidence stacks up against the Pakistan-based Laskhar-e-Taiba. The portents do not look good. The Mumbai attacks have thrown up in stark relief the reality of two opposing power centres in Pakistan, and the tensions between them. Before this, the civilian democratic government and the Army already clashed once in a significant way, and skirmished twice. The government lost the big one and though it was not humiliated in the other two, it did not exactly win them. The first time was in July when the government made a move to take over the Inter-Services Intelligence, the country’s main intelligence agency headed by a serving Lieutenant-General and controlled by the military, answerable only in name to the Prime Minister.
On the intervention of the Army chief, the notification placing the ISI under the Interior Ministry was withdrawn in the dead of night and a clarification issued about the “misunderstanding.” The second was after President Zardari offered to a glittering Delhi audience, over a satellite conference link, that his country would adopt a “no first-use policy” with regard to its nuclear weapons in any conflict with India. There was no reaction from the Pakistan Army but the top brass are said to be still seething over that remark, which upended the rationale behind Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The Army sees its nuclear weapons as a source of military parity with India, whose conventional military strength is greater. Radikal Guru Strong Dub Rar File here. The third time was when a senior Minister announced that the political wing of the ISI had been shut down.
The government’s official spokespersons have chosen not to go there, and it is unclear if this has indeed happened. The Mumbai attacks have now pitched both sides in a “do-or-die” battle. The first round has already played itself out, with the government giving a repeat of its July performance over the decision to send the ISI chief to New Delhi. This time, Mr. Zardari explained it away to the world as a “miscommunication” between Prime Ministers Yousuf Raza Gilani and Manmohan Singh. Well-documented links The most important test still lies ahead.
Although President Zardari and other senior government functionaries have repeatedly denied any link between the Mumbai attacks and the Pakistani state or any of its institutions, choosing instead the term “non-state actors” (or as in the case of Mr. Turn Csv File Into Xml Viewer. Zardari, “stateless” actors), the links between the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the ISI are well documented. The Pakistani establishment and the LeT’s front organisation, Jamat-ud-Dawah, have been saying in the last few days that the relationship ended with the ban on the group after 9/11. But those with an inside track on this in Pakistan know differently. Unlike other groups that demonstrated their anger by hitting back at the state, as for instance in the attempted killing of the then President, Pervez Musharraf, the LeT did not challenge the proscription. Experts in Pakistan believe the readiness with which LeT kept a low profile in Pakistan after shifting its operational command to Kashmir was an indication of its continuing links with the state machinery.
Veteran Pakistani journalist Zahid Hussain details the continuing indulgence of the state towards the LeT even after the 2002 ban in his 2007 book Frontline Pakistan. India’s demand that Pakistan take action against Let-JuD founder-leader Hafiz Saeed virtually asks the Zardari government to take on a child of the ISI and, by extension, the Army.
Going by the track record, it is not difficult to see who will emerge the winner of this round. Politically, the task for Mr. Zardari has been made all the more difficult because few people — they can be counted on the fingertips — are willing to see the presence of militant groups such as the LeT as a problem for Pakistan itself. For all its claims to represent the will of the people, the Pakistan government today finds itself isolated in its apparent willingness and sincerity to cooperate with India. President Zardari’s unpopularity with large sections of the opinion-making elite has not helped.